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EDITORIAL NOTE

Engaged scholars often adopt process perspectives
to get an understanding of how and why phenomena
of interest develop as they do. Typically, such studies
zoom in on a period of a few years because of practical
issues related to data collection and analysis. From that
perspective, this paper distinguishes itself by relying
on data covering a hundred years of development.
Engaged scholars seek to address problems of practical
relevance and to provide insights that can be helpful in
addressing these problems. In doing so, they often consider a controversial issue because practical problems
involve multiple stakeholders and rarely have simple
solutions. In this regard, this paper distinguishes itself
by focusing on a highly controversial issue that is also
politically contested, shaping business and society at
large. With a focus on the evolution of accounting rules
in the US over the past hundred years, King inductively
analyzes archival data about regulation. Analysis of
data from the perspective of rule makers and rule followers suggests that these parties jointly influence rule
development and behaviors resulting from evolving
rules. As a result, King reveals interesting patterns of
interaction between rule makers and rule followers
that explain why regulation of practices, such as in
accounting, is an ongoing and complicated process
with little chance of convergence towards a simple and
useful set of rules. As such, the article offers interesting insights for accountants as well as for professionals
within other highly regulated industries. At the same
time, King has opened the door for other engaged
scholarship studies that rely on traces of archival data
spanning multiple decades.
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The Observer Effect and
U.S. Accounting Rules
Thomas A. King
Case Western Reserve University

ABSTRACT
This inductive study evaluates how accounting rules promulgated by U.S.
standard setters have evolved over a century. Archival data viewed through
the lens of the observer effect—where the act of observation influences
the subject—reveals long-term patterns of behavior. The interaction of
rule makers and rule followers suggests three generalizations: Rule sets
grow, codification accelerates rule set growth, and interactions between
regulators and those who are regulated confound predictions about possible consequences of new rules. In other words, this system has never
reached equilibrium, despite 100 years of effort by accounting regulators
to constrain behavior of those who prepare financial statements. Because
unchecked rule growth increases the risks of costly compliance efforts and
unintended consequences, regulators should be cautious about codifying
rule sets, and scholars should look for methods to determine when existing
rule sets are sufficient to satisfy societal needs.

The author gratefully acknowledges suggestions from Gary Previts, Lars Mathiassen, and
three anonymous reviewers.
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SYNOPSIS
Purpose. Financial reporting is part of society’s efforts to allocate scarce resources.
Accounting systems measure transactions
so that managers can share indicators of
economic performance with investors.
Effective accounting processes allow better-performing firms to secure funding
under more attractive terms. In this communication between firms and investors,
executives are like writers: Writers choosing to use English to communicate with
readers have considerable latitude in how
they tell their stories, but the storytelling
efforts generally follow certain rules of
spelling, grammar, and syntax. Similarly,
executives using accounting to communicate with investors must use agreed-on
rules for recognizing, valuing, and classifying accounts. Without this structure,
financial statements become less useful
and risk triggering harmful investor decisions (King, 2017).
During the past century, accounting rules
have emerged in the United States in
attempts to control how firms report
transactions. Because self-interested
managers might bend or break these
rules when communicating with outsiders (Schipper, 1989), accounting standard
setters respond with new rules to remedy perceived deficiencies and close loopholes.
Consequences of this interaction have
been documented in a handful of
well-maintained websites, enumerated
in the Appendix. Analysis and interpretation of these archival records provides
important insights into how a rule set has
evolved over many decades and offers
provisional lessons for the broader field of
management on the effects of rulemaking.
Problem of Practice. Accounting rules stem
from regulators’ desire to promote fairness in capital markets. Investors might
be misled if firms report like transactions
in varied ways. The author has spent a career trying to learn these rules to prepare
financial statements that comply with U.S.
securities laws and to teach this skill to
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METHOD
accounting students. Interestingly, both
tasks have become more difficult over
the course of my career. The immediate
problem of practice is to understand why
accounting rules have become harder to
apply and learn, even though U.S. regulators have had a century of experience in
which to refine this rule set. The broader
management challenge is to determine
what might be learned from a century of
rule promulgation and compliance in one
domain of management practice.
Results. An archival study of accounting
rules promulgated since 1917 suggests
that regulators’ efforts to standardize financial reporting practices have brought
an ever-increasing number of rules to be
followed by preparers of financial statements. Some statement preparers interpret emerging rules in ways that make
their own firms’ reported results attractive to investors. Regulators respond by
issuing more rules to corral errant behavior. A circular cycle emerges as each group
reacts to the other’s actions. Use of the
observer effect suggests that such circular
interaction cannot lead to a stable state.
Conclusions. Three provisional generalizations emerge from this study: Rule sets
grow over time; codification accelerates
the rate of growth of a rule set; and the interaction of rule makers and rule followers
brings the risk of unintended consequences with new rules. Collectively, these three
generalizations suggest that an equilibrium is not possible for some rule sets.
Practical Relevance. Those who work in
regulated industries, where the interests of the regulator and regulated can
diverge, must be prepared to cope with
ever-expanding rule sets. To mitigate this
problem, managers and regulators should
collaborate to find ways to limit rule set
growth. Regulators should exercise caution when codifying rule sets, and scholars
could be helpful by establishing methods
to determine when a rule set is adequate
to meet conflicting stakeholder needs.

Research Question
This study frames the history of U.S. financial accounting standards as an interaction
between those who promulgate rules
and those who follow them. The research
question is this: “What can we learn about
rule sets from the study of U.S. accounting
standard setting during the past century?”
Method and Design
Conclusions rest on an inductive study of
U.S. accounting rules promulgated by four
organizations: the Federal Reserve Board
(Fed), the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) and its predecessor organizations, the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB). Analysis of historical precedents
might be used to form generalizations
about decision-making and management
practices (Neustadt & May, 1986).
Data Collection, Sample, and Analysis
Data come from archival records of seven
organizations associated with accounting
rules. (The Appendix lists the websites
used.) Although data are limited to the
documents that archivists have chosen to
retain and publish, the set of accounting
rules is likely complete. Recent U.S. accounting standards (i.e., those published
by FASB since 1973) offer discussions of
the logic and motivations for their promulgation. Motivations for financial statement preparers is unobservable, so data
on how rule followers interpret rules are
less robust. Inferences about the behavior
of statement preparers rest on academic
research, comment letters provided by
statement preparers during deliberations
about proposed rules, and reasoning given
by regulators in the documentation associated with certain rules. The data sets
offer a natural experiment, which provides
support for some generalization.
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PRACTICAL PROBLEM
Financial accounting rules in the United
States are difficult to learn and enforce.
Licensing requirements for certified public
accountants (CPAs) now include 150 semester-hours of university classroom instruction, typically requiring five academic
years of study. Teaching would-be CPAs
how to measure leases, pensions, and
taxes is no simple task. Despite spending considerable time in school and then
taking supplementary test preparation
courses outside of a university setting,
only about half of all candidates pass each
of the four requisite CPA examinations in
a given sitting. The scope of Enron-era
scandals, where firms avoided posting
billions of dollars of losses to financial
statements, illustrates the difficulty of
enforcing rules. What’s remarkable is that
U.S society faces these problems despite
a century of effort devoted to articulating
a clear set of rules for how businesses
should measure their transactions and report their financial position.

LITERATURE REVIEW
This research is based on a review of literature associated with the observer effect
and the nature of financial reporting. No
one has yet integrated these two literature
streams to reveal patterns of rule-generating behavior over a long time period.
In a pioneering effort at industrial research, engineers and social scientists
conducted six studies from 1924 to 1933
at Western Electric’s Hawthorne Works
plant outside of Chicago to evaluate the
effects of varied lighting, compensation,
and supervisory factors on worker productivity (Sonnenfeld, 1985). The most
significant conclusion was that changes in
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output arose not from manipulating physical working conditions but from the influence of outsiders’ observing the behavior
of subjects. This phenomenon came to
be known as the Hawthorne effect in
academic (Adair, 1984) and practitioner
(Economist, 2008) circles.
Scholars continue to debate the strength
and significance of Hawthorne data (Levitt & List, 2011); meanwhile, the term
“observer effect” has come to be used as
a label to describe how the act of observation influences the thing observed (e.g.,
when a tire gauge simultaneously measures air pressure and also changes its
level). Observer effects on human subjects
have been noted in studies ranging from
health care (Ostchega et al., 2003) to voting (Casas, Díaz, & Trindade, 2017) to interpersonal relations (Robins, Spranca, &
Mendelsohn, 1996). No known study has
applied the observer effect to the field of
accounting regulation.1
Financial reporting allows better-performing firms to distinguish themselves from
poor performers as they try to attract
capital on better terms (Healy & Wahlen,
1999). Accounting is a language that affords statement preparers considerable
latitude in how they communicate economic performance and prospects with
investors (King, 2017). Accounting regulations seek to constrain preparer behavior
to ensure that this communication is free
from ambiguity and bias, so that it can
be trusted by statement users (Nelson,
2003).2 Improper accounting impairs asset allocation and stewardship decisions
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999).
Research dating back to the 1890s provides evidence that statement preparers
interpret accounting rules to enhance their
reported results and to influence perceptions of company performance (Buck-

master, 2001). More recently, scholars
find evidence that managers manipulate
earnings to boost job security (DeFond &
Park, 1997) and to increase share price
valuations (Barth, Elliott, & Finn, 1999). A
former FASB standard setter notes that
statement preparers push back at new accounting standards that result in increased
earnings volatility (SEC, 2003). Regulatory
concern over the scope and significance
of earnings smoothing goes back at least
20 years (Levitt, 1998). Scholars note the
interdependence of accounting measures
and human behavior (Solomons, 1978) but
have not studied circular interaction over a
long time horizon.
Figure 1 suggests one way to frame this
integration. Consider two sets of stakeholders: The first comprises company executives who oversee the preparation of
financial statements that are to be shared
with investors. The second includes accounting regulators who seek to ensure
that financial statements are comparable across firms (Beresford, 1999) and to
highlight blemishes that could alert potential investors to future problems (Sprouse,
1987). In the United States, these regulators include accounting standard-setting
bodies, appointed government officials
who promote fair financial reporting, and
litigators who challenge the financial reporting practices of errant firms.
Preparers have incentives to measure
transactions in ways that make their firms
more attractive. Burnishing efforts seek to
boost share price valuations and promote
job stability. Extreme efforts elicit the old
Soviet joke that nothing is wrong, especially near the reactor. Regulators respond
by promulgating rules designed to eliminate ambiguity and promote fair financial
reporting. A growing rule set emerges
from the interaction of these two groups.
Researchers have noted how rules affect

1

Accounting literature uses terms such as rules, objectives, standards, regulations, interpretations, guidance, and principles to label efforts designed
to govern behavior of those who prepare accounting statements (SEC, 2003). For the sake of simplicity, the main body of this paper uses these words
interchangeably. Coding conventions used to analyze U.S. financial accounting standards are discussed in the Appendix.

2

For example, in 1938 the SEC issued Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 4, which states that financial statements filed with the SEC and using accounting
principles for which no substantial authoritative support exists (i.e., they do not conform with established rules) are presumed to be misleading. The SEC
reaffirmed this statement in 1973, with the issuance of ASR No. 150.
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Figure 1: Interdependence of Statement Preparation and Standard Setting

Preparers

Regulators

React to financial
accounting rules

React to interpretation
of accounting rules

[Observed]

preparers’ behavior for narrow accounting
topics, such as leases (Imhoff & Thomas,
1988) and derivatives (SEC, 2003), but
these studies have not evaluated how this
feedback loop plays out over many cycles.

FINDINGS
This study gives rise to three findings,
which are expressed as propositions to
challenge practitioner–scholars to test
whether they are generalizable to other
domains.
Proposition 1: Rule Sets Grow
The observer effect creates a circular
relationship between observed and observer. Two types of archival evidence
show how this relationship has evolved
between regulators and preparers. First
is the continued issuance of rules associated with the same topic over extended
time periods. Evolving accounting rules on
pensions, leases, goodwill, and taxes over
decades show that standard setters have
not been satisfied with earlier versions of
standards for these topics. Second, statement preparers write comment letters to
regulators to influence deliberations over
pending rules. Subsequent pronouncements cite comments given in the letters as part of the basis for conclusions
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[Observer]

reached. The observer and the observed
monitor each other.
To illustrate this interaction, statement
preparers repeatedly asked for clarification on how to account for derivatives
(Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 133, issued in 1998). The
standard’s basic principle is simple: Derivative financial instruments (e.g., options,
futures, and swaps) are to be recorded on
balance sheets as assets and liabilities at
fair values. The issue is determining what
to do with the gains and losses as instrument values fluctuate in volatile capital
markets. Deliberations preceding issuance
of this standard, where preparers pushed
back hard over concerns about reporting
volatile earnings, led to a 213-page document. After publication, preparers asked
for additional guidance, which gave rise to
many more pages of supplementary rules.
Motivations for this interaction likely come
from preparers’ desire to report results
that reflect positively on their firm’s financial strength and to avoid legal challenges
from regulators or litigators.
Accounting rules arise in part from the
frustration that companies report results
in varied ways. Early U.S. railroad enterprises treated depreciation differently,
confounding investor efforts to compare
performance. In 1906, Congress passed

the Hepburn Act to permit government
regulation of railroad accounting practices. The earliest identified collection of
U.S. accounting standards was a 14-page
article published in 1917 by a group of accountants in the Federal Reserve Bulletin to
promote uniform ways of preparing and
auditing balance sheet accounts (Federal Reserve Board, 1917). Member banks,
trading commercial paper issued by merchants and manufacturers, relied on these
statements to assess credit risk. The Fed
suspected that inconsistent accounting
would result in poor credit decisions and
would impair the health of the U.S. banking system.
During the Great Depression, Congress
created the SEC to restore investor confidence and endowed this administrative
agency with the authority to establish
accounting principles. The SEC showed
an early willingness to let private sector
experts take the lead in setting financial
accounting standards.
A predecessor of the AICPA showed
leadership and suggested a few additional principles to ensure that financial
statements would be fair. In 1939, this
organization created the Committee on
Accounting Procedure to narrow accounting differences through the publication of
Accounting Research Bulletins. Lessons
learned led the AICPA in 1959 to sponsor a
replacement organization, the Accounting
Principles Board, to publish more formal
Opinions based on a structured deliberation process. Continued SEC intrusion in
APB deliberations sparked a loss of confidence in the APB’s ability to narrow accounting differences (Zeff, 2018).
The accounting community responded by
creating the independent FASB. This successor organization receives its own funding plus formal SEC recognition as the sole
financial accounting standards setting
body in the United States. The FASB published Statements of Financial Accounting
Standards based on an exhaustive deliberation process. In 2009, the FASB codified
its extant Bulletins, Opinions, Standards,
and related technical documents and
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FIGURE 2: Growing Size and Forcefulness of U.S. Financial Accounting Rules
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*The FASB continues to issue Updates beyond 2017.

established a new framework in which
revisions, labeled Accounting Standards
Updates, modify relevant sections in the
codified rule set.3

Source documents came from prior work
published by teams working under the
direction of the AICPA (and a predecessor
organization), the SEC, and FASB.

Figure 2 shows a tabular summary of this
activity. What started as a short monograph in 1917 morphed into a body of
work that now spans about 11,000 printed pages.4

The numbering system places detailed
rules into nested hierarchies of topics,
subtopics, sections, and paragraphs. New
rules create, modify, or eliminate paragraphs. To illustrate, the last Accounting
Standards Update promulgated in 2017
states that steamship entities should
no longer use a method for measuring
deferred taxes for an industry-specific
transaction because of the expiration of
a different, statutory rule put forth by the
Internal Revenue Service. This Update affects paragraphs falling under Topic 740
(Income Taxes) and Topic 995 (U.S. Steamship Entities).

Proposition 2: Codification Accelerates
Rule Set Growth
Codification means arranging rules in a
systematic framework. The Code of Hammurabi (a list of Babylonian laws from
about 1750 BCE) and the annual Official
Baseball Rules published by Major League
Baseball are two of many examples. The
FASB’s 2009 codification sought to bring
all authoritative U.S. accounting rules into
one document to streamline compliance,
research, and communication activities.
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Codification solves tactical problems but
creates a strategic consequence. Note

the fourth row in Figure 2, which identifies
the annual rate of rule creation under the
four periods of accounting standard setting discussed in this paper. The pace of
change amounted to a handful of rules per
year before codification. After the 2009
codification, the rate tripled. Because the
rate of change accelerated after codification with no other identifiable changes
in the environment, a possible inference
is that codification causes faster rule set
growth. Put simply, codification appears
to act as a catalyst by speeding up the cycle time of observer effect feedback loops.
Corroborating evidence comes from a
natural experiment. Financial accounting
and tax accounting are two dialects of the
same language (King, 2006). Each seeks to
measure transactions, but with different
purposes and rules. Among other things,
financial accounting helps to measure net
income, a proxy for the amount of cash
that a firm can expect to collect from business activity in an accounting period. Cash
collections show the potential amount
of sustainable dividends that might be
paid to investors. Income tax accounting
measures the amount of taxable income
received in an accounting period and thus
the scope of tax revenues the government
can collect from business activity. Financial accounting and tax accounting rest on
overlapping but distinct principles, so net
income and taxable income in the United
States might be seen as cousins.
Congress created the modern U.S. income
tax system in 1913, four years before
private sector accountants published the
original Federal Reserve Bulletin article already discussed. By coincidence, the first
set of income tax rules, as documented in
the Revenue Act of 1913, was also about
14 pages.5 New tax laws emerge with
each Congressional legislative session. To

3

In 1953, the Committee on Accounting Procedure published Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 to combine rules from the 42 previous ARBs. I do not
consider this publication a codification because subsequent accounting rules were not numbered in a manner so that they could be inserted into the ARB
No. 43 classification system.

4

This estimate comes from adding together the numbers of pages in the five bound volumes that represent the FASB’s Accounting Standards Codification
(Norwalk, CT: Financial Accounting Standards Board, October 31, 2016).

5

See Section II, pages 166–180, of the Revenue Act of 1913, http://legisworks.org/sal/38/stats/STATUTE-38-Pg114.pdf accessed on October 24, 2018.
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help taxpayers sort through the growing
collection of rules, Congress authorized
three codification efforts (the Internal Revenue Code [IRC] of 1939, 1954, and 1986).
U.S. tax accounting and financial accounting rules have similar objectives and were
initially documented at about the same
time. Yet, initial codification came to tax
laws 70 years ahead of the effort to codify financial accounting rules. Today, the
scope of tax rules (statutes and regulations) is much larger than that for financial
accounting. The IRC and related Regulations now span more than 75,000 pages.6
Codification makes inserting new rules to
address tactical concerns easier.7
Supplementary support for the first two
propositions comes from foreign experience. An alternative approach to the granular U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) is use of the less detailed
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), promulgated by the International Accounting Standards Board since
2001, and the International Accounting
Standards (IAS) promulgated by the International Accounting Standard Committee
from 1973 (the year the FASB commenced
operations) until 2001. Current IFRS, IAS,
and related interpretation statements
posted on the IFRS website total roughly 1,400 pages—about an eighth of the
page count associated with U.S. financial
accounting rules. The lower page count
may be attributable to a shorter length
of time that international standards have
been promulgated (Proposition 1) and an
absence of codification of these standards
(Proposition 2).
Proposition 3: The Observer Effect
Confounds Predictions About Rule
Consequences
Rule creation invokes the observer effect,
where two groups with differing interests
interact over a prolonged period. Dynamic
interaction (e.g., chess matches, jury trials,
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and political elections) makes predicting
how rules will unfold difficult because the
actions of preparers and regulators depend on the behavior of the other group.
Accounting standard setting demonstrates complexity, where system behavior cannot be understood by examination
of component rules (Cilliers, 1998). No
long-term equilibrium likely exists.
Consider one incident to illustrate complexity underlying rule promulgation and
compliance. In 1993, Congress added
Section 162(m) to the Internal Revenue
Code. This new rule sought to rein in executive pay by disallowing deductions for
annual salaries greater than $1 million
paid to listed firms’ top executives. Beginning in 1994, any compensation over
the million-dollar limit had to be performance-based to qualify for a tax deduction. In response to this new rule, public
companies and their compensation committees developed pay plans linked to
stock options— financial instruments that
give the holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase shares at the option’s
exercise price. Financial accounting rules
at the time did not require firms to charge
option-based pay to income statements
when the exercise price equaled the market price.
Three unintended consequences emerged.
First, widespread use of options fueled an
explosion in CEO pay, a result completely
contrary to the desired outcome of the
code provision. Second, awards invited
subsequent option backdating and repricing schemes that allowed management
teams to extract wealth at shareholder
expense. Third, large option awards represented a moral hazard because they
motivated self-interested executives to
take bigger risks. Asymmetric option payoffs bring executives riches for successful
bets and investors losses for failed ventures. Option awards contributed to the
Enron-era accounting scandals, which in

turn led to a confusing series of financial
accounting standards focusing on how
and when to expense options (King, 2006).
The point is that this sequence of events
was not foreseeable to the legislator who
drafted a few words to create IRC Section
162(m).
A second example of unpredictable outcomes comes from accounting for situations where payments to tax authorities
exceed income tax expenses recorded on
financial statements using different measurement rules. The valuation question is
whether the difference should be recorded
on balance sheets as a deferred tax asset.
After decades of debate, no simple answer
has emerged.
Standard setters promulgated four pronouncements using the title “Accounting
for Income Taxes”: Bulletin No. 43 (1944)
discouraged recognition of deferred tax
assets; Opinion No. 11 (1967) required
recording of such accounts; SFAS No. 96
(1987) prohibited recognizing such accounts in common situations; and SFAS
No. 109 (1992) required recognition plus
the use of a valuation allowance to reflect
the uncertainty of realizing the future tax
benefit.
In simple terms, interaction between preparers and standard setters resulted in
three reversals of the original standard. A
crude analogy is a finding in a trial that is
reversed at the appellate level, reversed
again at the Supreme Court level, and
then reversed a third time through legislative change. Interestingly, the last rule in
this sequence requires use of a valuation
allowance, which might provide preparers with another tool to smooth income
(Schrand & Franco Wong, 2003). A lay person might wonder whether accountants
have any idea of what they are doing,
given the sustained vacillation. Another
question, unexplored here, is whether re-

6

http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/look-at-how-many-pages-are-in-the-federal-tax-code/article/2563032 accessed on October 18, 2018. This
estimate does not reflect the massive change in tax rules arising from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.

7

Identifying mediating factors which that lead from codification to acceleration in rule set growth is beyond the scope of this paper and a topic for a future study.

Engaged Management ReView

DECEMBER 2018, VOL. 2, NO. 2

peated reversals of opinion bring brand
damage to a professional community.

LESSONS FOR PRACTICE
Findings from this study suggest that
managers governed by rules should expect rule sets to grow. When these rules
become codified, managers should expect
the rate of rule accretion to accelerate.
Finally, the interaction between rule setters and rule followers makes predictions
of rule consequences uncertain. In short,
regulation can bring ever-growing managerial uncertainty. An organization’s risk
management program should include regulation within the taxonomy of risks to be
evaluated and managed.
Collectively, these findings suggest that
both managers and regulators should
exercise restraint before seeking either
to add rules to address short-term problems or to codify rules to streamline compliance. Unintended enforcement issues
could bring costly or harmful long-term
consequences. In short, more rules might
not be the best answer to the immediate
problem at hand. The point of this paper
is to warn management practitioners and
scholars that codification is a dangerous
master.
If rules are required, then both parties
should collaborate to find solutions that
minimize the use of strict, quantitative
boundaries that can be gamed. SFAS No.
13, on leases has bright-line tests for
when a lease obligation must be added
as a liability to a firm’s balance sheet. The
standard gave rise to an extended series
of technical amendments as leasing companies devised new lease structures that
allowed their clients to preserve off-balance sheet financing. That foreign firms
using more qualitative international accounting standards tended to avoid Enron-era accounting scandals might not be
a coincidence.
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CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY
This study shows how the observer effect
can be applied to the specific domain of accounting standard setting and to the general area of regulation. Of note to scholars
is the long-term, systemic study of how
stakeholders promulgate and interpret
rules. Ecologist Garett Hardin notes that
we can never merely do one thing (Hardin,
1985). Ripple effects of our actions extend
beyond anything we imagine.

Scholars can contribute by creating methods for assessing and revealing when
existing rule sets might be sufficient to
meet societal needs, and then by publishing their results. For example, one study
examines stock price bid-ask spreads (a
proxy for investor discomfort) and finds
that financial statements prepared under
precise U.S. rules are no more informative
than those prepared under less-detailed
International Accounting Standards (Leuz,
2003).

American accounting regulators’ efforts to
constrain preparer behavior has brought
an ever-increasing number of rules. Some
self-interested preparers modify statement preparation in reaction to new standards. This interaction brings a continually
unfolding (and unresolved) saga in determining how financial statements should
be prepared. The story of IRC Section
162(m), which sought to limit executive
pay, offers a cautionary tale of how a rule
change in one domain can have unforeseen consequences in another.

This paper also contributes to method by
showing how use of a longer term, century-long perspectives might be useful in
thinking about contemporary problems
that management faces. In this author’s
experience, reviewers for scholarly publications often require that literature reviews highlight the most recent data. This
paper demonstrates that a longer horizon
can reveal insights that might not be apparent when attention is focused on immediate experiences.

As such, regulation should not be studied as an industry-specific phenomenon.
Findings in this paper might be generalizable to other regulated domains, including health care (e.g., rules associated
with ICD codes to obtain payment for services rendered); education (e.g., rules to
measure achievement of learning goals
in classrooms); professional sports (e.g.,
rules to attract new viewers); energy (e.g.,
rules to measure carbon emissions), and
technology (e.g., rules to constrain unauthorized sharing of private information).
Future studies of regulation can benefit
by incorporating the observer effect when
evaluating long-term interactions of rule
makers and rule followers.

APPENDIX ON METHOD

The relationship between regulation and
interpretation might indeed be circular,
with no end in sight. The ongoing cat-andmouse game over lease accounting is an
example. Left unexamined, this system
will continue to result in the promulgation
of rules in perpetuity, adding constantly
to societal compliance and enforcement
costs.

To form provisional generalizations from
primary documents, this inductive study
relies on hermeneutics, which is both a
philosophy and a specific approach to analyzing qualitative data (Myers, 2013). This
approach is useful when the meaning of
the texts being considered is confusing or
contradictory.
Hermeneutic analysis involves interpretation of documents as both texts and parts
of a broader whole, searching for interdependence between specific passages and
a broad body of work (Boland, Newman,
& Pentland, 2010). The interpreter moves
repeatedly from detail to the larger picture
to search for meaning that might not have
been identified either by the documents’
authors or by previous readers. Provisional generalizations inform subsequent
analyses of specific passages. Repeated
cycles continue until novel interpretations
emerge.
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In this study, the source documents were
written by accounting regulators and
standard setters over the course of a century. These documents—including articles, pronouncements, standards, rules,
interpretations, SEC rules, the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code, and international accounting standards—were published by the following organizations:
• The Federal Reserve Board (fraser.stlouisfed.org);
•
Committee on Accounting Procedure
and the Accounting Principles Board (accountancy.olemiss.edu/accounting-libraries/);
•
Financial Accounting Standards Board
(asc.fasb.org);
•
Securities and Exchange Commission
(sec.gov; see also sechistorical.org);
• U.S. Internal Revenue Code (law.cornell.
edu/uscode/text/26); and
•
IFRS Foundation (ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-of-standards/).
The anonymous employees working
for government or private sector organizations were seeking to standardize
accounting practices. The documents,
penned over decades by regulators using
sterile voices, confounded this researcher’s ability to find social meaning in documented accounting rules.
Boland et al. (2010) articulate a half-dozen approaches for comparing specific passages (the textual realm) and the larger
environment (the social realm). The former
activity involves exegesis—that is, a close
reading of text details—and the latter involves search for meaning within a shared
community. This paper uses historical
criticism, the fifth of the six types of hermeneutical analysis suggested. Historical
criticism seeks to evaluate documents in
the cultural and physical context in which
they were created. Such analysis requires
readers to try to situate themselves in the
setting that gave rise to the documents.

Two historic trends were considered in this
project:
1. The rise of the role of the U.S. federal
government in regulating commerce
through the twentieth century. Creation
of the SEC during the Great Depression
is a notable example.
2. The increasing complexity of business
transactions. The use of complex derivative and leasing contracts in the second half of the twentieth century are
notable examples.
Through the period analyzed in this paper,
the U.S. government sought to impose
greater levels of oversight over an increasingly complex business landscape.
To compile the data used in Figure 2,
showing the growing size and forcefulness of U.S. financial accounting rules, I
constructed a coding convention to identify the qualitative data (textual realm) and
quantitative data (social realm) for financial accounting standards. The first cycle of
coding used four terms—bulletins, opinions, standards, and updates—to identify
acts of regulatory intervention by financial
accounting standard setters. These four
terms were combined to create a secondary code of rules to identify formal efforts
by regulators to constrain the behavior of
preparers of financial statements.
Textual analysis of documents classified
by the primary codes showed qualitative
differences in tone. Study of the syntax
and grammar associated with early bulletins suggested soft suggestions for the
ways that statement preparers could account for transactions. Similar analysis of
later bulletins suggested stronger recommendations, while study of more recent
standards showed a tone associated with
hard directives. My interpretation of the
changes is that, over time, rules became
more prescriptive— perhaps a predictable
consequence of an expanding government
seeking to impose order over an increasingly complex business landscape.

ume of new pronouncements. Although
bulletins, opinions, standards, and updates are distinct types of documents,
they all represent interventions into how
accountants should prepare financial
statements to be used by investors. Thus,
in the secondary coding, a rule was defined
as a discrete unit of measure of a regulatory intervention. Counting the number of
rules over time periods, as shown in Figure
2, offers a derivative measure suggesting
the rate at which rules were promulgated.
I did not use coding to study the documents issued by the Federal Reserve
Board, Internal Revenue Service, International Accounting Standards Board, or
International Accounting Standards Committee. To gauge the scope of rule promulgation, I used a crude measure of output:
the number of printed pages required to
display each of these rule sets. Because no
two publishers used the same font, page
size, margins, or spacing to print text, the
page counts represent a coarse measure
of output. When making comparisons between financial accounting rules, I simply
used orders of magnitude to be directionally correct Time periods for these
data sets were simply the total number of
years that each rule set has existed.
Keeping this paper a manageable length
required extreme discretion over selection
of examples. Other accountants reading
the same materials might develop different interpretations (Blumer, 1969). However, the specifics are less important than
the conversation that results. What does
matter is whether scholars and practitioners evaluate the three propositions
put forth in this study. Even if these propositions don’t stand the test of time, debate
over their validity can inform discussions
about the nature of regulation.

Use of the secondary code permitted a
quantitative measure indicating the vol-
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